





Employees commonly receive from their employers an "employee
handbook." That document is frequently an elaborate expression of the
employer's personnel policies. An employee handbook typically informs
the employee about grievance and termination procedures, severance
pay, insurance, vacation pay, and general operating rules. However, if
the employee happens to be one of the two out of three American work-
ers who is hired on an at-will basis' and thus can quit or be fired for any
or no reason, it is also common for that employee not to receive the
benefit of the promises found in the employee handbook.
This note examines whether employee handbooks can be considered
part of an at-will employment contract, thus binding the employer to the
provisions of his personnel manual. 2 After a brief discussion of the tradi-
tional employment-at-will doctrine,3 this note describes the contract
1. An employment contract can be terminable at will in one of two ways. First, it may be
expressly stated in the contract that the employment is terminable at will. Second, and more preva-
lent, the term of the employment may not be specified, thus invoking the employment-at-will doc-
trine. Note, Limiting the Right to Terminate at Will-Have the Courts Forgotten the Employer?, 35
VAND. L. REV. 201, 201 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Limiting the Right to Terminate at Will].
The employment-at-will doctrine in America provides that a hiring which is for an indefinite
term is an employment-at-will and may be terminated by either party at any time, with or without
cause. DeGiuseppe, The Effect of the Employment-At-Will Rule on Employee Rights to Job Security
and Fringe Benefits, 10 FORDHAm URB. L.J. 1, 8 (1981).
Approximately 60% to 65% of all American employees are employees at-will. Note, Protecting
At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93
HARV. L. RPv. 1816, 1816 n.2 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Protecting At Will Employees]. For
a detailed history of the doctrine of. employment-at-will, see Feinman, The Development of the Em-
ployment At Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL Hisr. 118, 119-29 (1976); Note, Job Securityfor the At Will
Employee: Contractual Right of Discharge for Cause, 57 CHu.[-]KENT L. REv. 697, 699-711 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Job Security]; Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L.
REv. 335, 340-47 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Note, Implied Contract Rights].
2. The scope of this note is limited to contract analysis. Arguments based on tort, public
policy, or statute will not be considered.
For a practical employee dismissal manual that is both recent and comprehensive, see H. PER-
Rrr, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTrCE (1984).
3. See infra notes 9-21 and accompanying text.
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analysis typically applied to employee handbooks which results in the
employer not being bound to his promises.4 However, the prevailing ju-
dicial attitude is fast changing. The note describes the struggle with basic
contract concepts experienced by courts undergoing change, as exempli-
fied by one jurisdiction,5 and then examines how some progressive courts
have refused to treat handbooks as hollow promises and instead have
held employee handbooks to be contractually binding.6 Finally, this note
argues that most courts, whether or not they have found employee hand-
books to be part of employment-at-will contracts, have used contract
analysis that is, at best, superficial.7 It then urges all courts to apply
unilateral contract analysis to employee handbook cases.8
II. BACKGROUND: THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL DOCTRINE
The employer-employee relationship is the product of an agreement
between the employer and employee regarding the nature of the work to
be performed and various terms and conditions of employment. As such,
it is contractual in nature. 9 And it has long been a major tenet of
America's common law of contracts that an employment relationship,
even though terminable at will, is nevertheless contractual as well. 10
The general rule that an employee "at will" may be terminated for
any reason is expressed in the often-quoted passage:
[Mien must be left, without interference to buy and sell where they
please, and to discharge or retain employees at will for good cause or
for no cause, or even for bad cause without thereby being guilty of an
unlawful act per se. It is a right which an employee may exercise in
the same way, to the same extent, for the same cause or want of cause
as the employer.' 1
4. See infra notes 22-46 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 47-72 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 73-93 and accompanying text.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 94-96.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 97-125.
9. Hamby v. Genesco, Inc., 627 S.W.2d 373, 375 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981) (citing 53 Am. JUR.
2d Master and Servant § 14 (1970)); W. OUTraN, THE RIGHTS OF EMPLOYEES 3 (1983); see 9 S.
WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1012 (W. Jaeger 3d ed. 1967).
10. See 9 S. WILLISTON, supra note 9, § 1017; 3A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 684
(1960 & Supp. 1971); see also Comment, Employment At Will and the Law of Contracts, 23 BuFFALO
L. REV. 211, 212-16 (1973).
11. Payne v. Western & Ati. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 518-19 (1884), overruled on other grounds,
Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 544, 179 S.W. 134, 138 (1915); see also National Protective Ass'n
of Stream Fitters v. Cumming, 170 N.Y. 315, 63 N.E. 369 (1902). The Cumming court captured the
individualism that came to characterize the employment-at-will doctrine:
It is not the duty of one man to work for another unless he has agreed to, and if he has so
agreed but for no fixed period, either may end the contract whenever he chooses. The one
may work or refuse to work at will, and the other may hire or discharge at will. The terms
of employment are subject to mutual agreement, without let or hindrance from anyone. If
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The notion of freedom of contract1 2 was the basis for the common law
presumption that because each party was free to contract for a specific
term-that is, the length of employment-the absence of that specific
term in the employment contract indicated a mutual desire of the parties
to retain the freedom to end their contract at any time.13
The employment-at-will doctrine has been beneficial to the employer
because he can more easily tailor his work force to the exigencies of any
business situation and he can easily remove any employee who is unpro-
ductive or incompatible with the employer.14 Similarly, courts have rec-
ognized the doctrine's beneficial effect on the free enterprise system.15
The doctrine, however, has had harsh effects on employees. 16 It has
long been the rule that in the absence of a fixed-term contract, unlawful
discrimination, or a specific constitutional right, a discharged employee
the terms do not suit, or the employer does not please, the right to quit is absolute, and no
one may demand a reason therefor.
Cumming, 170 N.Y. at 320-21, 63 N.E. at 369.
For modem expressions of the employment-at-will doctrine, see, for example, Bender Ship Re-
pair, Inc. v. Stevens, 379 So. 2d 594, 595 (Ala. 1980) (employment contract could be terminated by
either party with or without cause or justification); Jones v. Keogh, 137 Vt. 562, 564, 409 A.2d 581,
582 (1979) (employee is without remedy even if malice, retaliation, or bad faith were reasons for
discharge).
12. See M. Witmark & Sons v. Fred Fisher Music Co., 125 F.2d 949, 962 (2d Cir. 1942)
(Frank, J., dissenting), affid, 318 U.S. 643 (1943) ("[Mien should have the greatest possible liberty to
make such contracts as they please.").
13. Note, Reforming At-Will Employment Law: A Model Statute, 16 U. MicHl. J.L. REF. 389,
391 (1983).
14. Comment, supra note 10, at 240.
15. See, eg., Whittaker v. Care-More, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 395 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981). The Whit-
taker court wrote:
[B]ased upon our review of this area of the law we are compelled to note that any substan-
tial change in the "employment-at-will" rule should first be microscopically analyzed re-
garding its effect on the commerce of this state. There must be protection from substantial
impairment of the very legitimate interests of an employer in hiring and retaining the most
qualified personnel available or the very foundation of the free enterprise system could be
jeopardized.
Id., at 396.
16. See, eg., Loucks v. Star City Glass Co., 551 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1977) (employee-at-will
dismissed in retaliation for filing workmen's compensation claim); Hablas v. Armour & Co., 270
F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1959) (employee-at-will discharged after 45 years of satisfactory performance when
he was only one year away from retirement); Ivy v. Army Times Publishing Co., 428 A.2d 831 (D.C.
1981) (employee-at-will who testified at an administrative hearing at his employer's behest was fired
for revealing evidence under oath that proved damaging to employer); Martin v. Platt, 179 Ind. App.
688, 386 N.E.2d 1026 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (employees-at-will dismissed for reporting employer
kickbacks); Bell v. Faulkner, 75 S.W.2d 612 (Mo. Ct. App. 1934) (employee-at-will dismissed for
refusing to vote for a political candidate supported by employer); Fletcher v. Greiner, 106 Misc. 2d
564, 435 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (employee-at-will dismissed for refusing to continue
sexual relationship with employer); Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174
(1974) (employee-at-will fired after voicing concern over the safety of a product manufactured by his
employer).
Vol. 1985:196] EMPLOYEE HANDBOOKS
has no recourse against his or her employer. 17
Partly in recognition of the doctrine's unfairness to employees,
many commentators have criticized the doctrine I and the courts have
eroded it.19 As of 1983, twenty-nine states had granted some form of
common law exception to the at-will doctrine. Five other states, as well
as the District of Columbia, have indicated their willingness to do so.20
17. Brooks v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 805, 808 (D. Colo. 1983) (citing Justice
v. Stanley Aviation Corp., 35 Colo. App. 1, 4, 530 P.2d 984, 985 (1974); Amaan v. City of Eureka,
615 S.W.2d 414, 415 (Mo.), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 1084 (1981); Johnson v. National Beef Packing
Co., 220 Kan. 52, 54, 551 P.2d 779, 781 (1976); Lynas v. Maxwell Farms, 279 Mich. 684, 687, 273
N.W. 315, 316 (1937); Knudsen v. Green, 116 Fla. 47, 52, 156 So. 240, 242 (1934); Martin v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 121, 42 N.E. 416, 417 (1895)).
18. See, e.g., Bellace, A Right of Fair Dismissal. Enforcing a Statutory Guarantee, 16 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 207 (1983); Blades, Employment at Will vs Individual Freedom On Limiting the Abusive
Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1404 (1967); DeGiuseppe, supra note 1; Malin,
Protecting the Whistleblower From Retaliatory Discharge, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 277 (1983); Peck,
Unjust Discharges From Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1979);
Stieber & Murray, Protection Against Unjust Discharge: The Need for a Federal Statute, 16 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 319 (1983); Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal.- Time for a Statute,
62 VA. L. REV. 481 (1976); Weyand, Present Status of Individual Employee Rights, N.Y.U. 22d
ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 171 (1970); Note, Job Security, supra note 1; Note, Continued
Resistance to the Inclusion of Personnel Policies in Contracts of Employment: Griffin v. Housing
Authority of Durham, 62 N.C.L. REv. 1326 (1984); Note, Implied Contract Rights, supra note 1;
Note, Challenging the Employment-At-Will Doctrine Through Modern Contract Theory, 16 U. MICH.
J.L. REP. 449 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, Challenging the Employment-At-Will Doctrine];
Note, The Employment-At-Will Doctrine: Providing a Public Policy Exception to Improve Worker
Safety, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REPF. 435 (1983); Note, supra note 13; Note, Employment at Will: Emerg-
ing Protectionsfor the Employee, 22 WASHBURN L.J. 491 (1983); Comment, The At- Will Doctrine: A
Proposal to Modify the Texas Employment Relationship, 36 BAYLOR L. REv. 667 (1984). But see
Heinz, The Assault on the Employment at Will Doctrine: Management Considerations, 48 Mo. L.
REv. 855 (1983); Petrikin, In Defense of Employment at Will, 53 OKLA. BJ. 2209 (1982); Note,
Limiting the Right to Terminate at Will, supra note 1.
For an extensive bibliography of the employment-at-will doctrine, see The Employment-At-Will
Issue, LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) (Special Report) Vol. III, No. 23, at 81-85 (Nov. 22, 1982) [hereinaf-
ter cited as The Employment-At-Will Issue].
19. E.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330
(1980) (recognizing tort action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy); Cleary v. Ameri-
can Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980) (recognizing a covenant of good
faith in employment contracts).
20. Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 896 (3d Cir. 1983). Common law exceptions
to the employment-at-will rule have allowed recovery in recent years under tort and implied contract
theories for the wrongfully discharged employee. DeGiuseppe, supra note 1, at 23. The tort theory
of recovery provides what is often called "public policy exceptions" to the employment at will doc-
trine. Courts have granted relief to employees discharged for refusing to violate a criminal statute,
exercising a statutory right, fulfilling a statutory duty, and other violations of general public policy.
Note, Limiting the Right to Terminate at Will, supra note 1, at 204. Implied contract theory has
been used to find that a discharge constitutes a breach of the "implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing." DeGiuseppe, supra note 1, at 23-24. For a state-by-state survey and analysis of the excep-
tions, see A.B.A. LITIGATION SECTION, EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR RELATIONS LAW COMMITTEE,
EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY, 1984 REPORT OF THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-
WILL SUBCOMMITTEE, and The Employment-At-Will Issue supra note 18, at 8, 33-65.
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Perhaps as part of the general erosion of the employment-at-will
doctrine, the contract analysis applied to employee handbooks by some
courts is more favorable to employees than it has been in the past.
Although, as a matter of contract law, courts have traditionally refused
to grant relief to discharged or disgruntled employees on the basis of
provisions in employee handbooks, this judicial attitude is beginning to
change.21
EMPLOYEE HANDBOOKS
Policy statements in a personnel manual are usually considered uni-
lateral statements by the employer and thus subject to unilateral amend-
ment by him. Most courts,24 and some commentators, 25 find it hard to
imagine that promises found in an employee handbook that can be uni-
laterally amended could also be contractually binding. Even employer
promises that confer benefit to the employer, such as employee loyalty,
are mere gratuities with no contractual status.26
In the absence of consideration independent from performance of
the job by the employee, or mutual bargaining between the employer and
employee, most courts have found handbooks to be unilateral statements
by the employer and hence unenforceable. 27 In order to make provisions
Auth. of Durham, 62 N.C. App. 556, 557, 303 S.E.2d 200, 201 (1983); Williams v. Biscuitville, Inc.,
40 N.C. App. 405, 408, 253 S.E.2d 18, 20, cert. denied, 297 N.C. 457, 256 S.E.2d 810 (1979); Rich-
ardson v. Charles Cole Memorial Hosp., 320 Pa. Super. 106, 108-09, 466 A.2d 1084, 1085 (1983);
Reynolds Mfg. Co. v. Mendoza, 644 S.W.2d 536, 539 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982); Parker v. United Air-
lines, Inc., 32 Wash. App. 722, 726-27, 649 P.2d 181, 183-84 (1982); Ferraro v. Koelsch, 119 Wis. 2d
407, 412-13, 350 N.W.2d 735, 738 (Wis. Ct. App.), petitionfor review granted, 119 Wis. 2d 903, 353
N.W.2d 808 (Wis. 1984); Holloway v. K-Mart Corp., 113 Wis. 2d 143, 146, 334 N.W.2d 570, 572
(Wis. Ct. App. 1983).
24. Eg., Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 55, 551 P.2d 779, 782 (1976)
(manual is a unilateral expression of company policy the terms of which were not bargained for).
25. E.g., Brody, Labor Law: Deciphering the Word From Delphi, 58 CHI.[-] KENT L. REv. 439,
475 n.131 (1982) (when policy statements are subject to unilateral amendment by the employer, it is
difficult to understand how there can be a meeting of the minds).
26. See id. ("mhe mere fact that the employer derives some ultimate benefit from [promises in
a policy manual] does not differentiate them from most other gratuities.").
27. Eg., Caster v. Hennessey, 727 F.2d 1075 (11th Cir. 1984) (grievance procedure set out in
manual was neither bargained for nor mutually agreed upon); Mau v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 207 Neb.
308, 314, 299 N.W.2d 147, 151 (1980) (manual does not bind employer). See also Note, Challenging
the Employment-At-Will Doctrine, supra note 18, at 458 n.63 (citing Shaw v. S.S. Kresge Co., 167
Ind. App. 1, 328 N.E.2d 775 (1975); Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 551 P.2d
779 (1976); Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 196 Mont. 178, 638 P.2d 1063 (1982) (dictum); Weiner
v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982)).
The requirement of consideration is the most fundamental limitation on the enforcement of
promises. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 2.2 (1982). Consideration is the inducement to contract
that must exist if a court is to enforce a promise as a contract. Simply stated, consideration is "a
detriment incurred by the promisee or a benefit received by the promisor at the request of the prom-
isor." S. WILLISTON, supra note 9, § 102. A recent trend is to describe the requirement of consider-
ation in terms of a bargained-for exchange rather than in terms of a search for either benefit or
detriment. E. FARNSWORTH, supra. "The essence of consideration.., is legal detriment that has
been bargained for and exchanged for the promise." J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 4-1 (2d ed. 1977) (footnote omitted).
In the employment context, an employee's labor and services traditionally were viewed as con-
sideration for the salary paid by the employer. If the employee wanted the employer to be bound by
other promises, additional consideration was necessary. See Note, Implied Contract Rights, supra
note 1, at 351-52. For example, at the turn of the century, courts enforced oral promises of perma-
nent employment made to injured railroad employees in exchange for their executed written releases
from tort claims against the employer. The injured employee's surrender of the tort claims was
separate consideration and justified the enforcement of the contract for permanent employment. Id.
at 352-53.
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of a handbook contractually binding, something more than just the per-
formance of duties on the part of the employee and the payment of wages
on the part of the employer is needed.28 It is sometimes said that a hand-
book is not a contract because there is no "mutuality of obligation. '29
Why should an employer be bound by promises in the manual when the
employee is free to terminate his employment at any time and for any or
no reason?30
Courts have used such contract analysis regardless of whether the
employee handbook was published and distributed before31 or after32 the
plaintiff was hired. And finally, possibly in reaction to the call for
change, courts have expressed reluctance to depart from long-established
principles that require definiteness and certainty in the terms of employ-
ment contracts. 33
In Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co.,34 the Supreme Court of
Kansas wrote: "[The Policy Manual] was only a unilateral expression of
company policy and procedures. Its terms were not bargained for by the
28. See Note, Implied Contract Rights, supra note 1, at 351-52 (additional consideration is
needed to make employment contracts of indefinite duration binding).
29. "Mutuality of obligation requires that unless both parties to a contract are bound, neither is
bound." Sala & Ruthe Realty, Inc. v. Campbell, 89 Nev. 483, 487, 515 P.2d 394, 396 (1973).
30. See, e.g., Edwards v. Citibank, N.A., 74 A.D.2d 553, 554, 425 N.Y.S.2d 327, 328-29 (1980)
(the manual "does not create an obligation on the part of the employer to continue the employment
of the employee for life, subject only to the conditions set forth in the manual while leaving the
employee free to terminate his employment at any time and for any or no reason") (citations
omitted).
31. E.g., Sargent v. Illinois Inst. of Technology, 78 Ill. App. 3d 117, 121-22, 397 N.E.2d 443,
446 (1979) (if the handbook is distributed at the time of hiring, there is no consideration and proba-
bly no reliance); Shaw v. S.S. Kresge Co., 167 Ind. App. 1, 4, 7, 328 N.E.2d 775, 777, 779 (1975)
(employee was furnished a copy of the handbook when his employment began and for want of
mutuality of obligation or consideration, the handbook promises are not enforceable).
32. E.g., Caster v. Hennessey, 727 F.2d 1075, 1076-77 (11th Cir. 1984) (handbook given to
employee 10 months after beginning employment not binding on either party given that Florida law
has not relaxed the requirements of definiteness in employment contracts); Grimes v. Shearson/
American Express, Inc., No. 83-C-6344 (N.D. Ill. July 12, 1984) (available Feb. 8, 1985, on LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file) ("It is particularly absurd for plaintiff to contend that this was a contract of
employment when she did not receive a copy of the document until after she had begun working for
the defendant, she was employed without any particular term of employment and not in reliance
upon the document in question."); Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 54-55, 551
P.2d 779, 781-82 (1976) (there was no meeting of the minds or bargain for a policy manual that was
published and distributed to employees nine or ten months after commencement of plaintiff's em-
ployment); Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 196 Mont. 178, 183, 638 P.2d 1063, 1066 (1982) (if the
handbook is written and distributed after employment is accepted, there is no consideration or
reliance).
33. E.g., Muller v. Stromberg Carlson Corp., 427 So. 2d 266, 268 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
("An employee's entitlement to a particular term of employment or to particular salary levels on the
basis of criteria more subject to misunderstanding and dispute than definite terms in an employment
contract is not. . . the province of a court of law.").
34. 220 Kan. 52, 551 P.2d 779 (1976).
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parties and any benefits conferred by it were mere gratuities. Certainly
no meeting of the minds was evidenced by the [employer's] unilateral act
of publishing company policy."' 35 A simple expectation on the part of the
employee that, for example, good performance would be rewarded by
yearly bonuses as stipulated in a bonus schedule or plan has been held
insufficient to create a binding term of the employment contract.36 That
is not surprising given the judicial attitude that since employers can typi-
cally unilaterally amend or withdraw the policies of handbooks, it must
follow that nothing in handbooks can contain any strict promissory
language.37
In addition to citing lack of consideration or want of mutuality as a
bar to employees' contract claims, courts have also held that even if the
employee handbook constituted an employment contract, that contract
would still be terminable at will because the handbook does not set forth
all the terms of employment, particularly a fixed term of employment.38
For example, in Chin v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 39 the
court found that because the employer's code of conduct did not contain
all the terms of the employee's employment-that is, essential terms such
35. Id. at 55, 551 P.2d at 782.
36. Muller v. Stromberg Carlson Corp., 427 So. 2d 266, 268 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
37. See, e.g., Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 468, 443 N.E.2d 441, 447, 457
N.Y.S.2d 193, 199 (1982) (Wachtler, J., dissenting) (one would not expect a manual to contain any
strict promissory language given that the employer is free to amend or withdraw any provisions in
the manual).
38. See, e.g., White v. Chelsea Indus., 425 So. 2d 1090, 1090-91 (Ala. 1983) (even though a
handbook exists, there has to be an agreement specifying a definite duration of employment services
or limiting the employer's legal right to terminate the employment; otherwise the relationship is at-
will); Heideck v. Kent Gen. Hosp. Inc., 446 A.2d 1095, 1096-97 (Del. 1982) (an employee will find
no relief where the manual is merely a unilateral statement of company policies and where it does
not set out a definite term of employment for company employees) (citing Beidler v. W.R. Grace,
Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1013, 1016 (E.D. Pa. 1978), affld mem., 609 F.2d 500 (3d Cir. 1979); Terrio v.
Millinocket Community Hosp., 379 A.2d 135, 137-38 (Me. 1977); Johnson v. National Beef Packing
Co., 220 Kan. 52, 54-55, 551 P.2d 779, 781-82 (1976); Dickhaus v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co.,
No. A-3281-80-T2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 13, 1981), cert. denied, 89 N.J. 430 (1982)); Shaw
v. S.S. Kresge Co., 167 Ind. App. 1, 7, 328 N.E.2d 775, 779 (1975) ("Even assuming, arguendo, that
the handbook relied upon by appellant constituted a part of the contract, in the absence of a promise
on the part of the employer that the employment should continue for a period of time that is either
definite or capable of determination, the employment relationship is terminable at the will of the
employer."); Chin v. AT&T, 96 Misc. 2d 1070, 1073,410 N.Y.S.2d 737, 739 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (manual
does not contain all the terms of employment and is thus terminable at will regardless of the regula-
tions for termination found in the manual), affid mem., 70 A.D.2d 791, 416 N.Y.S.2d 160 (App.
Div. 1979), appeal denied, 48 N.Y.2d 603, 396 N.E.2d 207, 421 N.Y.S.2d 1028 (1979).
39. 96 Misc. 2d 1070, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Sup. Ct. 1978), aff'd mer., 70 A.D.2d 791, 416
N.Y.S.2d 160 (App. Div. 1979), appeal denied, 48 N.Y.2d 603, 396 N.E.2d 207, 421 N.Y.S.2d 1028
(1979). The plaintiff was a discharged employee who had relied on a "Code of Conduct," issued to
the employee as a guide to the employer's regulations, as establishing the basis of his employment
contract (which was otherwise oral), and also establishing the only grounds upon which his employ-
ment could be terminated. Id. at 1072, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 739.
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as the duties and responsibilities of the particular position, the length of
employment, and compensation-the code of conduct could not provide
the exclusive grounds for termination. 4°
In short, courts have traditionally rejected the argument that the
provisions of employee handbooks form a part of an at-will employment
contract. They have done so by finding no independent-or "extra"-
consideration, 41 no bargain or meeting of minds,42 no intent to create
contractual rights,43 and no fixed term in the handbook.44 Finally,
courts have also cited public policy concerns, such as business ineffi-
ciency and migration45 and employer retrenchment of beneficial em-
ployee policies,46 as reasons for not extending contractual status to
employee handbooks.
40. Chin, 96 Misc. 2d at 1073, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 739.
41. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
42. E.g., Lieber v. Union Carbide Corp., 577 F. Supp. 562, 564 (E.D. Tenn. 1983) (there must
be a meeting of the minds by the parties that the handbook's provisions conferred a contractual right
on the employee). See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
43. Eg., Lieber v. Union Carbide Corp., 577 F. Supp. 562, 564 (E.D. Tenn. 1983) (employer
did not intend to create an employee benefit and no such right was created).
44. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. The traditional contract analysis is perhaps
best exemplified by Edwards v. Citibank, N.A., 100 Misc. 2d 59, 418 N.Y.S.2d 269 (Sup. Ct. 1979),
af'd, 74 A.D.2d 553, 425 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1980). Edwards brought an action for breach of contract
and wrongful discharge against his former employer, a bank, claiming he was wrongfully discharged
in reprisal for having uncovered evidence of illegal foreign currency manipulation. Id. at 59, 418
N.Y.S.2d at 270. For the six years he was employed by the bank, the plaintiff had no formal written
contract and no fixed term of employment. Id. at 60, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 270. The plaintiff contended
not only that various staff handbooks and manuals comprised a written contract, but also that the
effect of those documents, which included other literature setting out broad employment policy
guidelines, was to give him a permanent position that was unlimited in duration. The plaintiff
claimed that although the contract was terminable by him at will, the bank could only terminate him
for cause. Id. The court dismissed the plaintiffs contention that the handbook constituted a con-
tract for three reasons:
First, it is utterly lacking in mutuality. Second, it is hornbook law that any contract for
an indefinite period of time is terminable at the will of either party at any time. Such a
contract is terminable "for any reason or for no reason." Third, the various manuals of-
fered by plaintiff do not constitute a written employment contract, since they do not exclu-
sively and completely define the terms and conditions of employment, its duration or the
rate of compensation, i.e., all the essential elements of a contract of employment.
Id. (citations omitted). For those reasons, the court found that the employer's policy documents
were "no more than broad internal policy guidelines which cannot be held to embody the exclusive
procedures for termination." Id.
45. Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 468-69, 443 N.E.2d 441, 447, 457 N.Y.S.2d
193, 199 (1982) (dissent); Whittaker v. Care-More, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 395, 396-97 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1981).
46. Southwest Gas Corp. v. Ahmad, 99 Nev. 594, 601, 668 P.2d 261, 265 (1983) (dissent).
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IV. CONTRACTUAL ANALYSIS OF EMPLOYEE HANDBOOKS IN
TRANSITION
The judicial treatment of employee handbooks is in transition. The
requirements of independent consideration, bargain, and the like are re-
ceiving increasing criticism.47 Consequently, in more and more jurisdic-
tions, employee handbooks are found to contain enforceable contract
rights.48 However, courts continue to struggle with the idea of the neces-
sity of independent consideration, particularly as it relates to employees
who are given a copy of an employee handbook when they begin employ-
ment, as opposed to those who receive a handbook after they have been
on the job for some time.
The transition in American courts is neatly reflected in Illinois, a
state that is a paradigm of the struggle with the contractual treatment of
employee handbooks. The status of Illinois law concerning whether em-
ployee handbooks are a part of an employment contract is well-illus-
trated by three cases. 49 What emerges from the three cases is the general
rule that employee handbooks are not contractually binding, but with
two notable exceptions. The cases give a flavor of the variety of fact
situations generally facing American courts today. The way Illinois
courts have distinguished these various fact situations reveals the appre-
47. See infra notes 73-93, and accompanying text.
48. See, eg., Vinyard v. King, 728 F.2d 428, 432-33 (10th Cir. 1984); Greene v. Howard Univ.,
412 F.2d 1128, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Gorrill v. Icelandair/Flugleidir, No. 80 Civ. 5577 (RLC)
(S.D.N.Y. May 14, 1984) (available Feb. 9, 1985, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Brooks v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 805, 810 (D. Colo. 1983); Leikvold v. Valley View Commu-
nity Hosp., - Ariz. -, 688 P.2d 170, 174 (1984) (en banc); Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal.
App. 3d 311, 329, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 927 (1981); Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App.
3d 443, 455-56, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 729 (1980); Salimi v. Farmers Ins. Group, 684 P.2d 264, 265
(Colo. Ct. App. 1984); Piper v. Board of Trustees, 99 Ill. App. 3d 752, 760, 426 N.E.2d 262, 267
(1981); Carter v. Kaskaskia Community Action Agency, 24 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 1059, 322 N.E.2d
574, 576-77 (1974); Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 334, 563 P.2d 54, 58 (1977);
Dahl v. Brunswick Corp., 227 Md. 471,476, 356 A.2d 221, 224-25 (1976); Toussaint v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 598-99, 292 N.W.2d 880, 885 (1980); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille,
333 N.W.2d 622, 629-30 (Minn. 1983); Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, No. C8-84-1065
(Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 22, 1985) (available Feb. 9, 1985, on LEXIS, states library, Minn file);
Hoemberg v. Watco Publishers, Inc., 343 N.W.2d 676, 678 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Southwest Gas
Corp. v. Ahmad, 99 Nev. 594, 595, 668 P.2d 261, 261 (1983); Forrester v. Parker, 93 N.M. 781, 782,
606 P.2d 191, 192 (1980); Hillis v. Meister, 82 N.M. 474, 477, 483 P.2d 1314, 1317 (N.M. Ct. App.
1971); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 465-66, 443 N.E.2d 441,445-46, 457 N.Y.S.2d
193, 197-98 (1982); Saunders v. Big Bros., Inc., 115 Misc. 2d 845, 847, 454 N.Y.S.2d 787, 790 (N.Y.
City Civ. Ct. 1982); Langdon v. Saga Corp., 569 P.2d 524, 528 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976); Banas v.
Matthews Int'l Corp., No. 1205 Pittsburgh (Pa. Super. Ct. June 15, 1984) (available Feb. 8, 1985, on
LEXIS, states library, Pa file); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, -, 685 P.2d
1081, 1087 (1984) (en bane).
49. Piper v. Board of Trustees, 99 Ill. App. 3d 752, 426 N.E.2d 262 (1981); Sargent v. Illinois
Inst. of Technology, 78 Ill. App. 3d 117, 397 N.E.2d 443 (1979); Carter v. Kaskaskia Community
Action Agency, 24 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 322 N.E.2d 574 (1974).
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hension of a jurisdiction in transition wholly to abandon the traditional
contract analysis.
The first Illinois case to discuss the contractual status of employee
handbooks was Carter v. Kaskaskia Community Action Agency.50 In
Carter, the employee had no written employment contract, and there was
no evidence of any oral contract governing the duration of his employ-
ment. Four years after the employee began work, the employer compiled
and adopted a personnel manual which was reviewed and accepted by
the employees and approved by the employer's board of directors.51 The
manual contained procedures for grievances and disciplinary actions in-
cluding dismissal. The employee argued that when his employer adopted
the manual, it became a contract binding on both parties and he was thus
illegally discharged because the manual's discharge procedures were not
followed.5 2 The Carter court held that the employee was illegally dis-
charged.53 According to the court, the manual was a modification of the
existing at-will employment contract-the manual was reviewed and ac-
cepted by the employees and later it was approved by the employer's
board of directors. 54 The court found mutuality of obligation from pro-
visions in the manual that required employees to give thirty days' notice
before resigning or lose their right to vacation pay, and required the em-
ployer to give employees certain grievance procedures.55 The court went
on to explain that the fact that the employee continued to work after the
modification of the contract also constituted assent to and consideration
for the modification creating the mutuality of obligation necessary to
bind both parties. 56
Thus, Carter stands for the proposition that an employee handbook
that is adopted after an employee is hired at will becomes part of the
preexisting employment contract if it is a modification of the contract-
entailing a process of employee review and acceptance-and the hand-
book is bargained for or given independent consideration in the form of
the employee's continuing to work after the handbook takes effect.5 7
In the second Illinois case, Sargent v. Illinois Institute of Technol-
50. 24 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 322 N.E.2d 574 (1974).
51. The court did not specify the mode of employee review and acceptance. Id. at 1058, 322
N.E.2d at 576.
52. Id. at 1057-59, 322 N.E.2d at 575-76.
53. Id. at 1058, 322 N.E.2d at 575.
54. Id. at 1058, 322 N.E.2d at 576.
55. Id. at 1059, 322 N.E.2d at 576.
56. Id




ogy, 58 there was no written contract; the employment was at-will. The
plaintiff, who was discharged, contended that the terms of the personnel
manual adopted and issued by the employer to its employees became an
employment contract and entitled him to the predischarge hearing pre-
scribed in the manual.5 9 The Sargent court distinguished Carter by not-
ing that (1) the guidelines set forth in the personnel manual were not a
modification of any preexisting employment relationship because the
plaintiff was given the manual when he began his employment; (2) the
terms set forth in the personnel manual were not bargained for; and
(3) the plaintiff provided no independent consideration to support the
predischarge hearing requirement. ° The manual was not an enforceable
contract but merely a "code for [plaintiff's] conduct."'61 Thus, Sargent
reasoned, as did Carter, that an employee handbook is not part of an at-
will employment contract unless the handbook is a modification of the
contract, is bargained for, and supported by independent consideration. 62
The third of the three Illinois cases addressing the contractual status
of employee handbooks is Piper v. Board of Trustees,63 involving a writ-
ten employment contract for a term of one year.64 The court in Piper
held that the employee manual was incorporated into the written con-
tract which stated that the plaintiff's appointment was subject to the "by-
laws, policies and regulations of the Board of Trustees. ' 65 The court
distinguished Sargent by noting that in Sargent there was no "written
contract, so it would be impossible to incorporate by reference a person-
nel manual."'66 Piper thus stands for the proposition that employee hand-
books can be part of an employment contract when two conditions are
met: (1) a written contract is executed by the employer and employee;
and (2) the written contract can be construed as subject to the "policies"
of the employer.67
What emerges from Carter, Sargent, and Piper is a general rule, with
two exceptions, that employee handbooks are not part of an employment
contract. Under the first exception, if the employee handbook is a modi-
fication of a preexisting contract and there is mutuality of obligation,
then the employee handbook becomes a part of the employment con-
58. 78 Ill. App. 3d 117, 397 N.E.2d 443 (1979).
59. Id. at 118, 397 N.E.2d at 444.
60. Id. at 121-22, 397 N.E.2d at 446.
61. Id. at 122, 397 N.E.2d at 446.
62. See id. at 121-22, 397 N.E.2d at 446.
63. 99 Ill. App. 3d 752, 426 N.E.2d 262 (1981).
64. Id. at 756, 426 N.E.2d at 265.
65. IM. at 755, 426 N.E.2d at 264.




tract.68 The second exception states that when a written contract can be
construed as subject to the policies of the employer, then the employee
handbook is incorporated into the existing employment contract.6 9
The Illinois cases imply that if an employee were given a copy of a
handbook and asked to review it before accepting employment, a process
having some of the characteristics of a "modification," his commence-
ment of work would not constitute sufficient consideration or bargaining
to make the handbook binding.70 There seems to be no good justification
for the distinction that continuing to work after a new handbook is ap-
proved by employees constitutes consideration, whereas commencing
work after approving an existing handbook does not constitute consider-
ation. The same process of mutual agreement occurs when an employee
reviews and accepts the provisions of a handbook before, after, or con-
temporaneously with commencing his employment. In all these in-
stances, the employee begins or continues to work fully aware that his
employer's personnel manual will, from that moment on, apply to him.
In addition, Illinois courts have suggested that personnel manuals
are not incorporated into oral contracts whose terms explicitly state that
the employer's policies or personnel manual are a part of an employment
contract.71 It does not seem to make sense that such incorporation can
take place when the contract is written but not when it is oral. What is
important is that an agreement exists and not that the agreement has
been memorialized. 72
In sum, the Illinois experience demonstrates that courts, in light of
the traditional approach to bargain and consideration, are reluctant to
68. Carter, 24 Ill. App. 3d at 1059, 322 N.E.2d at 576.
69. Piper, 99 Ill. App. 3d at 760, 426 N.E.2d at 267. The same analysis of the three Illinois
cases has been adopted by the United States District Court for Northern Illinois. See Wogan v.
Nissan Motor Corp., No. 84-C-6885 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 1985) (available Feb. 25, 1985, on LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file); Enis v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 582 F. Supp. 876 (N.D.
Ill. 1984); Rynar v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 560 F. Supp. 619 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
70. See Enis v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 582 F. Supp. 876, 879 (N.D. Il1. 1984)
(by accepting the handbook when commencing employment, the employee "merely agreed to prop-
erly perform her required duties and nothing more"); Sargent, 78 Il. App. 3d at 122, 397 N.E.2d at
446 (by agreeing to be bound by the handbook he was given when he began his employment, the
employee "merely agreed to properly perform his required duties and nothing more"); Note, Con.
tract Law: An Alternative to Tort Law as a Basis for Wrongful Discharge Actions in Illinois, 12 LoY.
U. CHI. L.J. 861, 882 (1981) (In Illinois, "an employee who accepts work from an employer who has
already promulgated a personnel policy is considered not to have bargained for that policy").
71. See Piper, 99 Il. App. 3d at 760, 426 N.E.2d at 267. See also Rynar v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.,
560 F. Supp. 619, 624 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (when the employment contract is oral, the incorporation
argument of Piper is not available). Although in Piper the employment was for a definite term, this
should not affect any incorporation analysis for at-will employees.
72. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 27, § 1-1 (" [R]ules of law utilizing the concept
'contract' rarely refer to the writing itself. Usually, the reference is to the agreement; the writing
being merely a memorial of the agreement.").
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extend contractual status to all employee handbooks and that those that
have tried to extend contractual status to some employee handbooks have
found it difficult to reach a consistent treatment. The Illinois courts are a
paradigm of what can happen when courts move, step by step, away from
the traditional treatment of employee handbooks. The results are incon-
sistent, illogical, and ultimately unsatisfactory.
V. THE PROGRESSIVE VIEW OF THE CONTRACTUAL STATUS OF
EMPLOYEE HANDBOOKS
By its very definition, the employment contract that is terminable at
will carries with it no mutually agreed-upon standard for the dissolution
of the employment relationship. 73 More progressive courts,74 however,
have been willing to use the provisions of employee handbooks as a stan-
dard for the dissolution because they have refused to view handbooks as
"'corporate illusions, "full of sound. . . signifying nothing." ' "75 This
new approach to employee handbook cases has involved a full-scale at-
tack on the notions of the necessity of independent consideration and
mutuality of obligation and on the doctrine of employment-at-will
itself.76
The leading case in the attack on the traditional approach is Tous-
saint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield,77 in which the Supreme Court of Mich-
igan upheld a jury verdict for a plaintiff, an employee-at-will, who
claimed he had been discharged without just cause in violation of his
employer's personnel manual, which provided that employees would be
terminated for just cause only, pursuant to certain procedures. 78 The
Toussaint court completely rejected the idea that the provisions of an
employee handbook must be bargained for:
We hold that employer statements of policy, such as the Blue
Cross Supervisory Manual and Guidelines, can give rise to contractual
73. Petrikin, supra note 18, at 2212.
74. For lack of a better term, "progressive courts" describes those courts that have rejected
outright the contract analysis traditionally used by courts addressing employee handbook cases. See
infra notes 75-93 and accompanying text.
75. Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 462,443 N.E.2d 441,443,457 N.Y.S.2d 193,
195 (1982) (Kupferman, J., dissenting, quoting W. Shakespeare, Macbeth, V, v, 27-28, 83 A.D.2d
810, 811,442 N.Y.S.2d 11,12). See also Fletcher v. Wesley Medical Center, 585 F. Supp. 1260, 1265
(D. Kan. 1984) (employee handbooks are not "legally insignificant sound and fury").
76. See infra notes 77-93 and accompanying text.
77. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
78. Id. at 595, 597-98, 292 N.W.2d 883-84. The employer, Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michi-
gan, "published and distributed a 260-page manual establishing elaborate procedures promising '[t]o
provide for the administration of fair, consistent and reasonable corrective discipline' and 'to treat
employees leaving Blue Cross in a fair and consistent manner and to release employees for just cause
only.'" Id. at 617, 292 N.W.2d at 893.
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rights in employees without evidence that the parties mutually agreed
that the policy statements would create contractual rights in the em-
ployee, and, hence, although the statement of policy is signed by
neither party, can be unilaterally amended by the employer without
notice to the employee, and contains no reference to a specific em-
ployee, his job description or compensation, and although no reference
was made to the policy statement in pre-employment interviews and
the employee does not learn of its existence until after his hiring.79
The court placed great importance on the fact that Blue Cross, by issuing
an employee handbook, had created a situation" 'instinct with an obliga-
tion'" such that employees could justifiably rely on the handbook's
policies.8 0
An impressive number of jurisdictions have followed Toussaint's
reasonable expectation rationale.81 Nonetheless, Toussaint simply uses
an estoppel argument, invoking the idea of reliance,82 and fails to address
fully the issue of consideration. Other progressive courts, however, have
79. Id. at 614-15, 292 N.W.2d at 892.
80. Id at 613, 617, 292 N.W.2d at 892, 893 (quoting McCall Co. v. Wright, 133 A.D. 62, 68,
117 N.Y.S. 775, 781 (1909), aft'd, 198 N.Y. 143, 91 N.E. 516 (1910). A situation "instinct with an
obligation" can be created even when there is no meeting of the minds; the employee is not aware of
the particulars of the employer's policies and the employer can unilaterally amend the policies. The
court wrote:
No pre-employment negotiations need take place and the parties' minds need not meet on
the subject; nor does it matter that the employee knows nothing of the particulars of the
employer's policies and practices or that the employer may change them unilaterally. It is
enough that the employer chooses, presumably in its own interest, to create an environ-
ment in which the employee believes that, whatever the personnel policies and practices,
they are established and official at any given time, purport to be fair, and are applied con-
sistently and uniformly to each employee. The employer has then created a situation "in-
stinct with an obligation."
Id. at 613, 292 N.W.2d at 892 (citations omitted).
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma has gone so far as to say that the publication of personnel
policies "is the equivalent of constructive knowledge on the part of all employees not specifically
excluded." Dangott v. ASG Indus., 558 P.2d 379, 383 (Okla. 1976).
For a more detailed analysis of Toussaint, see Casenote, Master & Servant-Employment Con-
tracts-The burden of establishing standards of performance as a basis for employment termination
rests upon the employer. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 59 U. DET. J. URB. L. 83 (1981);
Casenote, Employment Contract-Indefinite Length-Hiring Terminable By Employer for Cause
Only Without Mutuality of Obligations-For Cause Requirement Implied Where Reasonable Expec-
tations Created By Employee Policy.Manual, 28 WAYNE L. REV. 373 (1981).
81. See Brooks v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 805, 809 (D. Colo. 1983) (citing
Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983); Arie v. Intertherm, Inc., 648
S.W.2d 142, 153-54 (Mo. App. 1983); Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp., 293 Or. 96, 100, 643
P.2d 1276, 1278 (1982); Hamby v. Genesco, Inc., 627 S.W.2d 373, 376 (Tenn. App. 1981); Langdon
v. Saga Corp., 569 P.2d 524, 527 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976); Wagner v. Sperry Univac, Div. of Sperry
Rand Corp., 458 F. Supp. 505, 520-21 (E.D. Pa. 1978), affld mem., 624 F.2d 1092 (3d Cir. 1980);
Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College, 636 P.2d 1063, 1066 (Utah 1981) (tenure denial)).
82. See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 617, 292 N.W.2d 880, 893
(1980) (since employer published and distributed a manual establishing elaborate disciplinary proce-
dures and promising to dismiss employees for just cause only, employees "could justifiably rely on
these expressions and conduct themselves accordingly").
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made an attempt to address that issue and have rejected the idea that
independent consideration--consideration other than services to be ren-
dered-is necessary to support a contract based on employer promises as
found in an employee handbook.83 Independent consideration is viewed
as a rule of construction, not of substance;84 it serves the evidentiary
function of determining if the parties intended to be bound by certain
terms, 85 and its absence is not a bar to finding a valid contract. Thus, the
rule of additional consideration
does not preclude the parties, if they make clear their intent to do so,
from agreeing that the employment will not be terminable by the em-
ployer except pursuant to their agreement, even though no considera-
tion other than services to be performed is expected by the employer or
promised by the employee.86
Similarly, the requirement of mutuality of obligation has been criti-
cized and the need for it deemed synonymous with the need for consider-
ation.8 7 According to this view, the mere performance of services is
sufficient consideration to make an employee handbook part of an at-will
contract, whether the handbook is viewed as a modification to a preexist-
ing contract (as when it is given to an employee after he begins work)88
or as part of the original contract (as when an employee is given the
handbook when he begins employment). 89
Finally, the doctrine of employment-at-will is viewed as a rule of
construction, rather than one of substance.90 The doctrine itself does not
preclude the parties from proving they intended that the employment
relationship could be terminated only pursuant to their agreement, even
83. E.g., Vinyard v. King, 728 F.2d 428, 432-33 (10th Cir. 1984); Brooks v. Trans World Air-
lines, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 805, 809-10 (D. Colo. 1983); Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d
311, 324, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 924 (1981); Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443,
454-56, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 727-30 (1980); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 627
(Minn. 1983); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 464-65, 443 N.E.2d 441, 444-46, 457
N.Y.S.2d 193, 196-98 (1982).
84. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 326, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 925 (1981);
Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 452, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 727 (1980) (citing
Drzewiecki v. H & R Block, Inc., 24 Cal. App. 3d 695, 703-04, 101 Cal. Rptr. 169, 174 (1972)); Pine
River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629 (Minn. 1983).
85. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 326, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 925 (1981).
86. Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629 (Minn. 1983).
87. Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 463-64, 443 N.E.2d 441, 444, 457 N.Y.S.2d
193, 196 (1982); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629 (Minn. 1983).
88. E.g., Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 627-30 (Minn. 1983); Southwest
Gas Corp. v. Abroad, 99 Nev. 594, 595, 668 P.2d 261, 261-62 (1983).
89. E.g., Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hosp., 141 Ariz. 544, 548, 688 P.2d 170, 173
(1984) (en bane); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 460, 443 N.E.2d 441, 444, 457
N.Y.S.2d 193, 196-98 (1982).




if no consideration, other than services performed, is given.91 The very
freedom of contract argument which has long been used to justify the
employment-at-will doctrine92 has been used to criticize the traditional
application of that doctrine: "There is no reason why the at-will pre-
sumption needs to be construed as a limit on the parties' freedom of con-
tract. If the parties choose to provide in their employment contract of an
indefinite duration for provisions of job security, they should be able to
do so."' 93 While traditional courts have effectively barred recovery by
insisting that if there is no additional consideration for a handbook the
at-will rule will permit discharge for any reason, progressive courts have
discounted both the need for additional consideration and strict adher-
ence to the employment-at-will rule, viewing both as rules of
construction.
VI. THE WAVE OF THE FUTURE THROUGH A DOCTRINE OF THE
PAST: UNILATERAL CONTRACT ANALYSIS OF EMPLOYEE
HANDBOOKS
Beyond the merits of the discussion concerning the need for consid-
eration which has so split American jurisdictions, there is something arti-
ficial about how nearly all of the traditional and progressive courts have
analyzed the contractual status of employee handbooks. Although both
types of courts have nearly always discussed the consideration necessary
to bind an alleged agreement embodied in the provisions of the hand-
book, they have also nearly always neglected to discuss the agreement
itself. The process of agreement is commonly analyzed by looking for an
offer and an acceptance,94 yet, the employee handbook cases fail to pay
even perfunctory attention to these most basic tools of contractual
analysis.
Analytically, it is important in employee handbook cases to study
the agreement process for two reasons. First, handbook language may
not be specific enough to constitute an offer. If a court fails to examine
the specificity of handbook language in order to ensure that strict prom-
issory language exists, it may give a plaintiff unwarranted relief. Failure
to examine closely the provisions of an employee handbook is really a
failure to determine if a plaintiff's reliance was justifiable. It may be a
simple proposition, but by explicitly addressing the question of whether a
91. Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 628-29 (Minn. 1983).
92. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
93. Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 628 (Minn. 1983); see also Leikvold v.
Valley View Comunity Hosp., 141 Ariz., 544, 546, 688 P.2d 170, 173 (1984) (the employment-at-will
rule is not a limit on the parties' freedom to contract.).
94. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 27, § 3.3 (outlining traditional offer and acceptance analysis).
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handbook's provisions are sufficiently specific to show an intent by the
employer to make an offer, a progressive court, which will find the con-
sideration requirement easily met, may be less likely to give effect to os-
tensible promises. 95
Second, an offer must be communicated and accepted. In the em-
ployee handbook context, this means that before a plaintiff can find relief
in contract, he must show that the handbook was not solely an internal
document for management but that it was published for general distribu-
tion to employees--communication of the offer-and that he was gener-
ally aware of the policies and continued to work for the employer-
acceptance. 96 In this way, a discharged employee who was not even gen-
erally aware that his employer had published termination procedures in a
handbook until after he was discharged will not find relief because there
was no communication of the offer, and hence no acceptance and
reliance.
In short, courts dealing with employee handbooks in an at-will em-
ployment situation should apply an analysis found in the common law of
contracts-unilateral contract theory. Under that theory, when only one
of two parties to a contract has made a promise, the contract is unilat-
eral; a bilateral contract, by contrast, is one in which both parties have
made promises.97 In bilateral contracts, both parties must be bound or
there is no contract. Unilateral contracts have no such requirement. 98
Thus, unilateral contracts are an exception to the doctrine of "mutuality
of obligation." For example, if an employer offers his at-will employees a
bonus if they remain on the job for a specified period of time and the
employees continue to work through that specified period, they will be
95. See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
96. See, eg., Southwest Gas Corp. v. Ahmad, 99 Nev. 594, 595-601, 668 P.2d 261, 262-65
(1983) (Steffen, J., dissenting) (to constitute an offer, handbook must be more than "current direc-
tory" of company policies, and acceptance requires employee to be aware of offer).
97. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 27, § 1-10. The typical teaching example of the
difference between a unilateral and bilateral contract involves the Brooklyn Bridge:
If A says to B, "If you walk across Brooklyn Bridge, I promise to pay you ten dollars," A
has made a promise but he has not asked B for a return promise. He has requested B to
perform an act, not a commitment to do the act. A has thus made an offer to a unilateral
contract which arises when and if B performs the act called for. If A had said to B, "If you
promise to walk across Brooklyn Bridge, I promise to pay you ten dollars," his offer re-
quests B to make a commitment to walk the bridge. A bilateral contract arises when the
requisite return promise is made by B.
Id.
Whether or not the offeree intended to accept a unilateral offer is important because perform-
ance of the requested act is not necessarily in response to the offer. Id. § 2-16. The Restatement of
Contracts (Second) provides that an intent to accept is presumed, in the absence of words or conduct
to the contrary, when the act is done with knowledge of the offer. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
CONTRACTS § 53, comment c (1981).
98. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 27, § 4-15.
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entitled to the bonus. Continuing to work is consideration. Even though
the employees were not requested to nor were in any way obligated to
continue working-that is, there was no "mutuality of obligation"-the
employer is bound to his promise.99
While the dichotomy between unilateral and bilateral analysis found
in the common law plays a less important role in contemporary contract
analysis,100 it is nonetheless appropriate and useful in the employee hand-
book context. Unilateral contract theory may not be appropriate for an-
alyzing "complex negotiations typical of substantial transactions,"10 t but
the typical employee handbook case, like the employee bonus case, is a
simple enough transaction that unilateral contract analysis can ade-
quately describe the process of agreement that takes place between an
employer and an employee.
Unilateral contract analysis, combined with the progressive court
approach to consideration, is particularly useful in the employee hand-
book context because it can effectively balance the competing interests of
employer and employee. The reasonable expectations of both parties will
be protected. Under unilateral contract analysis, the employer, by using
certain handbook language, 10 2 will still be able to change company policy
as his business environment and needs change, while benefiting from a
loyal and cooperative work force that results from the establishment of
stable company policies.103 At the same time, employees who are aware
of company policy and who naturally expect to benefit from certain pro-
visions of a handbook will be able to do so, as long as the company policy
remains in effect.' 04 In that way, for example, employees who are prom-
ised that certain grievance and termination procedures will be followed
99. Id. Another example is that of the option contract (or irrevocable offer) that contains a
promise to sell or buy in exchange for a price. The offeror must perform at the election of the offeree
who is in no way obliged to take the option. Both parties have provided consideration and that is
enough to make a contract; no mutuality of obligation is necessary. Id.
100. E. FARNswoRTH, supra note 27, § 3.4.
101. Id. § 3.5.
102. See Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 627 (Minn. 1983) ("Language in
the handbook itself may reserve discretion to the employer in certain matters or reserve the right to
amend or modify the handbook provisions.").
103. In establishing personnel policies, "the employer secures an orderly, cooperative and loyal
work force, and the employee the peace of mind associated with job security and the conviction that
he will be treated fairly." Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 613, 292 N.W.2d
880, 892 (1980).
104. Of course, the employee will be bound by the terms of the handbook in that he or she must
satisfy any necessary conditions precedent attached to particular benefits found in the handbook.
See Sweet v. Stormont Vail Regional Medical Center, 231 Kan. 604, 606, 612, 647 P.2d 1274, 1277,
1281 (1982) ("In order to be entitled to payment for accrued vacation time upon termination of
employment, the claimant was required to give [her employer] two weeks' notice of her intent to
quit, [as required by the handbook].").
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cannot be properly discharged, under their employment-at-will con-
tracts, without having first been given the benefit of the procedures prom-
ised in the handbook.
Moreover, unilateral contract analysis will not seriously threaten the
existence of the employment-at-will doctrine, an attractive prospect for
the so-called "traditional" courts. Employees hired at no fixed term, ab-
sent unlawful discrimination, a judicially imposed good cause require-
ment or statutory protection, can still be dismissed for any reason, good
or bad, as long as the provisions found in company handbooks are
followed.
Unilateral contract analysis has recently been applied to an em-
ployee handbook case by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in Pine River
State Bank v. Mettille.105 At the beginning of its inquiry into the con-
tractual status of an employee handbook distributed after the plaintiff
was hired, the court recognized the importance of not only examining
consideration, but also the agreement process itself: "Whether a hand-
book can become part of the employment contract raises such issues of
contract formation as offer and acceptance and consideration."' 10 6 The
court stated that just as a promise of employment on particular terms of
employment of unspecified duration may be a binding unilateral con-
tract, if in the form of an offer and accepted by the employee, so may
handbook language create a binding unilateral contract.'0 7 If the hand-
book's language is sufficiently specific, it may create an offer.108 In order
for the offer to be accepted, it must be communicated to the employee by
105. 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983). In Pine River, the Pine River State Bank sued a former
employee, Mettille, on two notes on which he was in default. Mettille counterclaimed, alleging that
the bank had breached his employment contract, as subsequently modified by an employee hand-
book. Id. at 625.
Mettille's employment contract was entirely oral and was not for a specific term; it was at will.
Id. at 624. About seven months after Mettille was hired as a loan officer, the bank distributed a
printed "Employee Handbook" that contained several job security provisions. Ia Of particular
importance was a section entitled "Disciplinary Policy," that provided for a three-stage disciplinary
procedure. The first and second "offenses" would receive reprimands, and thereafter an employee
would be suspended or discharged. Discharge was only "for an employee whose conduct does not
improve as a result of the previous action taken." Id. at 626. The section concluded with the sen-
tence: "In no instance will a person be discharged from employment without a review of the facts by
the Executive Officer." Id.
Following an unannounced examination of the bank and an internal investigation that revealed
Mettille was responsible for 57 of the 58 "serious" technical exceptions discovered, Mettille was fired
by the president of the bank. The disciplinary procedures outlined in the handbook were not fol-
lowed. Id. at 624-25.
106. Id. at 625.
107. Id. at 626-27.
108. Id. at 626. But, "[ain employer's general statements of policy are no more than that and do
not meet the contractual requirements for an offer." Id.
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dissemination of the handbook to the employee. 109
After it has been determined that an offer is found in a handbook's
language and that the offer was communicated to the employee, the next
step in the analysis, according to the court, is to determine if there was an
acceptance of the offer and if consideration has been furnished, making
the contract enforceable. 110 Analogizing to a case in which an em-
ployer's promise of a bonus has been held to be an enforceable unilateral
contract,1 1 the court held that an employee's retaining his employment
constitutes acceptance of the handbook's offer and continuing to work
supplies the necessary consideration. The court wrote:
In the case of unilateral contracts for employment, where an at-will
employee retains employment with knowledge of new or changed con-
ditions, the new or changed conditions may become a contractual obli-
gation. In this manner, an original employment contract may be
modified or replaced by a subsequent unilateral contract. The em-
ployee's retention of employment constitutes acceptance of the offer of
a unilateral contract; by continuing to stay on the job, although free to
leave, the employee supplies the necessary consideration for the
offer.112
The court then concluded "that personnel handbook provisions, if they
meet the requirements for formation of a unilateral contract, may be-
come enforceable as part of the original employment contract."11 3
After examining the reasons traditionally given for not enforcing job
termination restrictions in an employment-at-will contract, the Pine
River court adopted the progressive treatment of consideration and mu-
tuality of obligation. 14 The indefiniteness inherent in an employment-at-
will contract, according to the court, does not by itself "preclude hand-
book provisions on job security from being enforceable, whether they are
proffered at the time of the original hiring or later, when the parties have
agreed to be bound thereby." '"5 Thus, although Pine River dealt with a
newly introduced handbook modifying the preexisting employment-at-
109. Id.
110. Id. at 626-27.
Ill. Id. at 627. The court cited Hartung v.Bilhmeier, 243 Minn. 148, 155, 66 N.W.2d 784, 790
(1954), where it had held that an employer's promise of a bonus made after the employee started
working was enforceable.
112. Pine River, 333 N.W.2d at 627. It is possible to characterize the unilateral contract in such
a way that the employer will not be held to have breached the contract if he modifies or replaces the
handbook after the employee has already accepted the unilateral offer by commencing work or con-
tinuing to work. One possible formulation "is to characterize the employer's promise something like
this: 'I promise I will not dismiss you. . . without exhausting specified procedures. . . unless I
change this policy before you are discharged.'" H. PERRrrr, supra note 2, at 150 (citation omitted).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 628-30. See also supra notes 73-93 and accompanying text.
115. Pine River, 333 N.W.2d at 629-30 (emphasis added).
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will contract, the court made it clear that a handbook offered at the time
of hiring can also be an enforceable unilateral contract. 116
Finally, the Pine River court recognized that treating employee
handbooks as unilateral contracts does not unduly circumscribe the em-
ployer's discretion. An employer can still limit transactional costs of hir-
ing employees by making a unilateral offer in an employee handbook
rather than making separate contracts with each individual employee
and by changing policies as it sees fit: "Unilateral contract modification
of the employment contract may be a repetitive process. Language in the
handbook itself may reserve discretion to the employer in certain matters
or reserve the right to amend or modify the handbook provisions."' 17
116. The court then applied the principles of unilateral contract theory and the progressive treat-
ment of consideration to the facts before it. The court began by holding that the handbook language
in the section entitled "Job Security," id. at 626 n.2, was not specific enough to constitute an offer; it
was no more than a general statement of policy. Ia at 630. However, the court held that the
handbook section entitled "Disciplinary Policy" did "set out in definite language an offer of a unilat-
eral contract for procedures to be followed in job termination." Id. That section contained the
explicit promise that if "an employee has violated a company policy, the following [three step termi-
nation procedure] will apply." Id.
The offer contained in the section entitled "Disciplinary Policy" was communicated to all em-
ployees, including Mettille, by distribution of the handbook. Id. at 624, 630. The court found that
Mettille's continued performance of his duties, despite his freedom to quit, constituted both an ac-
ceptance of the bank's offer and the necessary consideration for the offer. The bank gained the
advantages of a presumably more stable and productive work force. Id. at 630. The court con-
cluded: "Therefore, we hold as a matter of law the bank breached its employment contract with
Mettille by not affording him the job termination procedures of its handbook, resulting in Mettille's
unemployment." Id. at 631.
Another application of unilateral contract analysis to an employee handbook case appears in
Langdon v. Saga Corp., 569 P.2d 524, 527-28 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976) (personnel policies extending
benefits [i.e., accrued paid vacation time and certain severance allowances] may be construed as
unilateral offers which are accepted by continued performance and requirement of mutuality is met
in that no benefits can accrue under those policies until performance has occurred); see also Wagner
v. Sperry Univac, Div. of Sperry Rand Corp., 458 F. Supp. 505, 520 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (unilateral
contract analysis reveals that the at-will employment relationship is not inevitably a legal nullity),
affid mem., 624 F.2d 1092 (3d Cir. 1980); Chinn v. China Nat'l Aviation Corp., 138 Cal. App. 2d
98, 99-102, 291 P.2d 91, 92-94 (1955) (employer's regulations constituted an offer of a unilateral
contract that was accepted by employee when he continued to work); Haney v. Laub, 312 A.2d 330,
332 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973) (an employee stock option agreement represents an enforceable unilateral
contract); Banas v. Matthews Int'l Corp., No. 1205 Pittsburgh (Pa. Super. Ct. June 15, 1984) (avail-
able Feb. 9, 1985, on LEXIS, states library, Pa file) ("Conceptually in the at-will employment con-
text, an employee manual is best viewed as part of an employer's unilateral offer of employment.")
(citations omitted); Amicone v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 19 Utah 2d 297, 300, 431 P.2d 130, 132
(1967) ("[T]he retirement plan is in the nature of a unilateral contract."); Hercules Powder Co. v.
Brookfield, 189 Va. 531, 540-41, 53 S.E.2d 804, 808 (1949) (memo promising severance pay distrib-
uted by the employer to the employees was offer which was accepted by the employee by performing
his services).
117. Pine River, 333 N.W.2d at 627.
For a view that is critical of the Pine River decision, see Case Note, At-Will Employment-
Contractual Limitation of an Employer's Right to Terminate: Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333
N. W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983), 7 HAMLINE L. REv. 463 (1984). The author of that case note considers
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Other courts have recognized that employers are free to exclude or
modify the benefits found in an employee handbook to the extent that
accrued benefits-e.g., vacation and severance pay-are not affected; the
exclusion or modification of accrued benefits must be done prospec-
tively.118 And, of course, the employer is free not to make an offer at all
simply by not issuing a handbook or making it clear and conspicuous
that the handbook is not part of the employment-at-will contract.119 In
this way, an employer will create no reasonable expectations of perform-
the court's approach in Pine River to be "unorthodox" and asserts that the "principal difficulty with
the court's analysis is... that a contract was deemed to exist although neither party was aware of
it." Id at 476-77. The author does not believe that the distribution of a handbook and the retention
of a job after accepting a handbook can be an objective manifestation of a contract. Id. at 477. One
must wonder if the author believes that employers issue handbooks as a gratuitous source of infor-
mation with no expectation of receiving any benefit in the form of employee loyalty and the like, and
that employees read handbooks with the clear understanding that all of the employer promises found
in handbooks are non-binding.
In rejecting the analysis adopted by the Pine River court, the case note argues that a better way
to serve the interests of both employer and employee is to infer a covenant not to discharge employ-
ees for refusing to violate public policy, as expressed in a statute or constitution. Id. at 481-82. Such
a proposal, however, is wholly inadequate to protect the interests of the plaintiff in Pine River or the
interests of plaintiffs in typical employee handbook cases. Pine River simply is not a retaliatory
discharge case. See Pine River 333 N.W.2d at 630 ("We are not dealing with a discharge that is
retaliatory, in bad faith or abusive."). The plaintiff in Pine River complained that he was denied the
benefit of disciplinary procedures found in the handbook; he did not complain, and could not suc-
cessfuliy have complained, that he was dismissed for refusing to violate a constitutionally or statuto-
rily expressed public policy. What is more, it is inconceivable that any plaintiff in the typical
employee handbook case, where employer promises are allegedly broken, will find relief by asserting
the public policy exception.
For a general discussion of the public policy exception, see DeGiuseppe, supra note I at 30-34,
36-39; supra note 20 and accompanying text.
118. See, eg., Langdon v. Saga Corp., 569 P.2d 524, 527-28 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976) ("employer
remains free to modify such policies prospectively and to the extent there is no accrual").
119. See, eg., Fletcher v. Wesley Medical Center, 585 F. Supp. 1260, 1264 (D. Kan. 1984) (dic-
tum) ("appropriate express disclaimers [in employee handbook] could make it obvious that employer
was not giving up its right to fire at will"); Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hosp., - Ariz. -,
688 P.2d 170, 174 (1984) (en bane) (dictum) ("Employers are certainly free to issue no personnel
manual at all or to issue a personnel manual that clearly and conspicuously tells their employees that
the manual is not part of the employment contract."). However, oral assurances by an employer
that an employee will receive the benefit of the handbook's provisions may render the handbook's
disclaimer ineffective. A court addressing such a situation wrote:
[rIo the extent that the oral assurances of severance pay conflicted with the manual's dis-
claimers, or induced [employees] to disregard their significance, we hold that such repre-
sentations will negate the effect of disclaimers which are intended to absolve the employer
from liability for unilateral alterations of or deviations from policies presented in the writ-
ten manual or similar employer writings.
Helle v. Landmark, Inc., 15 Ohio App. 3d 1, _, 472 N.E.2d 765, 775 (1984) (citation omitted). It
should be noted that the court in Helle found that because the plaintiffs were told that the plant
would be closed within a year, "their employment relationship ceased to be one terminable 'at-will'
and, instead, become one for a reasonably specific or reasonably determinable period." Id. at -, 472
N.E.2d at -. Whether an employment contract is at-will or for a definite term should be of no
consequence to the finding that oral promises can render a handbook's disclaimer ineffective.
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ance, but neither will he be able to induce a more stable or efficient work
force. 120
In summary, under unilateral contract analysis, the promises and
benefits found in employee handbooks will become part of an at-will em-
ployment contract if the following conditions are met: (1) the promises
found in the handbook are specific enough to constitute an offer;121
(2) the offer is communicated by the distribution of the handbook to the
employee;122 (3) the employee who is generally aware of the company
policy, 123 accepts the offer found in the handbook by commencing work
or continuing to work;124 (4) by thus commencing work or continuing to
work while retaining the freedom to quit, the employee provides consid-
eration sufficient to make a unilateral offer binding.125
VI. CONCLUSION
Employers do not issue employee handbooks simply out of altruistic
impulses; they expect to receive some benefit. Likewise, employees do
not read and comply with employee handbooks simply because they have
warm feelings about their employer; they, too, expect to receive some
benefit. Traditional courts, with an unduly restrictive view of the em-
ployment-at-will doctrine, have failed to understand this. Many progres-
sive courts, with a perfunctory use of contract analysis, have failed to
120. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 613, 618, 292 N.W.2d 880, 892, 894-
95 (1980).
121. See, eg., Ellis v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2995, 2997 (D.N.M. 1983)
(the provisions of a handbook must be definite in order to constitute a contract), afd, No. 84-1095
(10th Cir. Feb. 11, 1985) (available Feb. 25, 1985, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Cir file); Lieber v.
Union Carbide Corp., Nuclear Div., 577 F. Supp. 562, 564 (E.D. Tenn. 1983) (relatively general
statements in a handbook do not create contractual rights); Borden v. Skinner Chuck Co., 21 Conn.
Supp. 184, 191-92, 150 A.2d 607, 610-11 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1958) (policy stating that it was custom-
ary to give bonuses was not an offer).
122. Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 626, 631 (Minn. 1983). For the offer to
be capable of acceptance, the employee need not have read the handbook itself prior to or during his
employment; the employee may learn of the benefit in a number of ways, such as talking to fellow
employees or reading company notices. DeGiuseppe, supra note 1, at 51-52.
123. The employee does not have to know the particulars of the employer's policies. Toussaint
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 613, 292 N.W.2d 880, 892 (1980).
124. Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 627, 629-30 (Minn. 1983).
125. See Pine River, 333 N.W.2d at 627, 629-30. Any concern with the judicial administrabiity
of applying unilateral contract analysis to employee handbook cases is satisfactorily addressed by the
fact that the pleading in such cases will be simple. The plaintiff will have to plead that the promises
found in the handbook were specific enough to constitute an offer, that he was generally aware of the
handbook promises, and that he thus accepted the unilateral offer and provided consideration by
commencing work or continuing to work. Similarly, the employer can plead that the promises were
too vague to constitute an offer, that the employee was completely ignorant of the employer
promises, or that the handbook stated clearly that the employer promises were not a part of the at-
will employee's contract. For a general discussion of pleading in an employee dismissal case, see H.
PERrTr, supra note 2, §§ 4.21-.22.
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explain this. All courts are urged to apply unilateral contract analysis to
employee handbook cases. In this way, employer discretion will be main-
tained and employees relying on employer policy will be protected.
Richard Harrison Winters
